Skip to main content
OlympiadHQ

Browse · MathNet

Print

Team Selection Test for IMO

Turkey counting and probability

Problem

Let denote a society of voters where each voter is endowed with preferences over a set of alternatives with , . A preference profile is an -tuple of linear orderings on representing the preferences of voters on . Given some , the -plurality choice rule chooses the alternatives achieving the highest vote after each voter assigns equal votes for all top alternatives in his preference ordering regardless of their ranking. Let and be any two preference profiles and . We say that -dominates iff for every , all alternatives which are ranked below in are also ranked below in . The -plurality choice rule is said to be monotone iff for any and any which -dominates , if is chosen by the -plurality choice rule in , is still chosen in . Assume , prove that is necessary and sufficient condition for the monotonicity of -plurality choice rule. (Semih Koray).
Solution
Let . Since at least one alternative obtained all votes. Therefore, any chosen obtained votes in profile and by definitions obtains also votes in profile . Thus, the condition is sufficient for monotonicity.

Let . We construct a profile : for the first voter is the first, is the last. For the second, is the second, is the last. For all other voters, is the first, is the second. Each of and are not selected by exactly one voter. In our profile each alternative also is not selected by at least one voter. It is possible, since . No alternative obtained votes, and are chosen by getting votes.

The only difference between profiles and is that the first voter charged the positions of the second alternative and . Obviously, -dominates , but obtained votes, obtained votes and is not selected. Thus, -plurality choice rule is not monotonic.

Let . 1-plurality choice rule is monotonic if : if is chosen, obtained at least 2 votes, in any other profile also gets at least 2 votes and other alternatives also get at most 2 votes! In other cases an example similar to the example above shows that the 1-plurality choice rule is not monotonic. Done.

Techniques

Pigeonhole principleColoring schemes, extremal arguments